Religion and literacies in higher education: scoping the possibilities for faith-based meaning making

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(Received 1 August 2016, accepted 7 December 2016)

Abstract
Academic literacies pursues a transformative agenda, which involves ‘exploring alternative ways of meaning making in academia, not least by considering the resources that (student) writers bring to the academy as legitimate tools for meaning making’ (Lillis and Scott, 2007: 13). How we select what the legitimate tools for meaning making are is assumed in these studies, but not established. Given the generally fraught status of religion in the academy, a perspicuous instance of this problem resides in the question of whether religious faith constitutes a ‘legitimate tool for meaning making’. We therefore need to think about how we establish what can and cannot be said to be legitimate tools, and whether this should be decided as a matter of normative principle, or whether it can be arrived at empirically. Further, we would need to consider how such questions are to be properly incorporated into learning and assessment. This article uses qualitative data from studies into religion and higher education to provide some initial thoughts on how these questions could be addressed. It carries out a scoping exercise that sheds light on the possibilities of the employment of religious identity in academic writing. It concludes that religious ideas and identities may on occasion be relevant without implying a threat to disciplinary rigour.

Keywords: academic literacies, disciplines, higher education, identity politics, knowledge, meaning making, religion, voice, voice discourse

Introduction
The field of academic literacies has two clearly stated and complementary aims: first, a research agenda that aims to produce qualitative studies of literacy events and literacy practices (Lea and Street, 1998); and second, a transformative ideological agenda that aims to bring about change within the academy, that is, to ‘[explore] alternative ways of meaning making in academia, not least by considering the resources that (student) writers bring to the academy as legitimate tools for meaning making’ (Lillis and Scott, 2007: 13). This second

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aim wishes to dispel as myths ‘the homogeneity of the student population, the stability of disciplines, and the unidirectionality of the teacher-student relation’ (Lillis and Scott, 2007: 13). The ideological strand of academic literacies is therefore ‘concerned not only to identify conventions but also to problematize them in relation to students’ interests and experiences’ (Lillis and Scott, 2007: 14), a concern perhaps better understood as emancipatory (or ecumenical) (Adams, 2015) rather than subversive (cf. Paxton, 2007). Change in the academy is seen as worth pursuing in that literacy conventions, and the ideologies and epistemologies than underpin them, are seen as contingent rather than inevitable (Lillis et al., 2015); also in that there are ‘dominant ideologies’ in the academy that serve to reproduce existing power structures. The questions that academic literacies scholars ask, under the aegis of the transformative agenda, concern ways in which these dominant epistemologies and ideologies, supported by dominant ‘surface’ literacy practices, could be broadened and contributed to by those who bring alternative epistemologies, ideologies, and semiotic resources to the academy:

…. how have particular conventions become legitimized—and what might alternatives be? To what extent do they serve knowledge making—and are other ways of making knowledge, and other kinds of knowledge / knowing possible? Whose epistemological and ideological interests and desires do these reflect and enable—and whose interests and desires may be being excluded? (Lillis et al., 2015: 9)

… the dominant models are still privileging students from select cultural and language groups and excluding the others. Consequently, the dominant ideologies keep on reproducing themselves. Can we not begin to imagine ways in which these different identities and literacy practices can make a contribution to the discourses and institutions of higher education? (Paxton, 2007: 53)

At this point, a few questions suggest themselves. The first concerns the criteria for deciding exactly what count as ‘legitimate tools for meaning making’ in the academy. Either we conclude that any and all resources are potentially legitimate ones; or else we need to establish criteria for what resources can and should be adduced. If this latter option is seen as more appropriate, a second set of questions would be necessary: how, when, and where would these resources become relevant to the process of establishing meaning in higher education instruction and assessment? Academic literacies has a prevailing interest in power relations, and is unashamedly critical in its approach (see Lea and Street, 1998; Lillis, 1999; Pahl and Rowsell, 2011). Thus, some of its studies have approached what are essentially class differences in literacy practices (Badenhorst and Kapp, 2013; Haggis, 2006); others have addressed non-traditional learners (Lillis, 2001), gender (Moss, 2007), sexuality (Ivanic, 1998) and racial and ethnic differences (Paxton, 2012) in deploying literacy. Often, these identity markers are combined to provide a general idea of what it is like to come to write in a university as a member of a historically excluded group.

However, academic literacies research has not addressed instances of students with a religious affiliation. These students, needless to say, will bring with them their own faith-inspired meaning making resources. In addition, religious identities will combine with other
aspects of identity, and become relevant in various ways and with varying magnitudes according to context: a hoary sociological idea most recently incarnated in the notion of intersectionality (McCall, 2005). Religious identity, perhaps more than any other, leads us to think about what place it can have in the modern university. This is due, not least, to the recent controversies that have been documented in universities concerning religious faith, and identity politics more generally.

These issues take on a particular puissance in post-colonial and post-Apartheid South Africa, which alongside the United Kingdom (UK) has been most prominent in developing the post-structuralist strand of academic literacies (Starfield, 2007). South Africa has a high level of religiosity among young people (Nell, 2016), incorporating not only Christianity but also a range of other, including traditional African, religions. Religion played an important role in post-apartheid reconciliations (Vander Lei and Fitzgerald, 2007). More recently, the South African higher education literature tells a clear story of the ongoing relevance of religion as a motivation and coping mechanism for under-represented groups (Bangeni and Kapp, 2005; Badenhorst and Kapp, 2013; Pym and Kapp, 2013). So far, religion has played in a role in substituting for a lack of cultural capital (Pym and Kapp 2013, Boughey, 2012), but in line with post-structural work elsewhere, South African scholars are starting to ask how physical access to its universities might go hand-in-hand with encouraging ‘epistemological access’ (Boughey, 2012: 145) through close studies of the experience of under-privilege, and through an intersectional approach to the ‘subordinated knowledges’ of African students (Soudien, 2016: 200).

This paper will begin by outlining the contemporary higher education context in which academic literacies stakes its claims. The thesis here is that the prevalence and visibility of identity politics on university campuses (Mayberry, 1996, Fish, 2005) is creating a context in which opinion can easily become bifurcated between those student groups, diversity activists, and academics who believe that universities should encourage the communication of values, and a counter-movement of scholars who maintain that universities should communicate disciplinary (if not objective) knowledge. It appears to us that the polemics of the last few years could have the unintended consequence of casting academic literacies as symptomatic of this debate. We will then outline some of the features of academic literacies research with a view to finding possible ways of navigating this divide. Following this, we will start on the main purpose of this paper: to initiate an investigation as to whether religious faith can qualify as a ‘legitimate tool for meaning making’ in the academy, and if so, under what circumstances. Finally, we will briefly suggest some implications of the discussion generally for the post-colonial university.

‘Knowledge’ vs. ‘voice’ in academic literacies

It is often assumed that universities are a ‘product of the Enlightenment’ (Warhime, 1993) and that they embody a secular ethos, one that promotes the values of reason, rationality, and scepticism (Porter, 2001; Guest et al., 2013), in opposition to matters of faith. In Europe, the idea of secularisation goes back at least to the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Furthermore, the process of modernisation, as put succinctly by Bruce (2002: 2), ‘creates problems for religion’. Secularisation, assumed to accompany the modernisation of society, reduces the significance of religion and replaces it with rational thought and belief systems, with science
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and technology their exemplary manifestations. As a reflection of modern society, the university is often considered secular by nature or by design. While religious attendance in some parts of the world is indeed growing, such as Islam in Europe and Pentecostal Christianity in parts of Africa, some prominent social theorists have been resistant to the notion that an increase in stated religious affiliation and attendance by themselves signal a reverse of overall secularising tendencies (Berger, 1999; Bruce, 2011). Even so, it is these same sweeping modernising tendencies that some see identity politics as coming to oppose (e.g. Dawson, 2014).

The last few years have seen a visible increase in campus polemics: news stories concerning safe spaces, no-platforming, freedom of speech, the ‘whiteness’ or otherwise of curricula and teaching staff, and the differential access to and achievement within higher education of different social groups, are now legion. Equivalent debates in South Africa have had a more consequential grounding in political protest, as well as a longer history of ‘transformative remedies’ in higher educational curricula, educational philosophy, and pedagogical practice (Cross, 2004: 402 ff.) In fact, many of these debates are not that new, but are recent expressions of matters that have been discussed since at least the advent of Cultural Studies (Maton, 2004) with its critique of existing disciplines (see Wade, 1997) and the New Sociology of Education (Moore and Muller, 1999), and possibly as far back as the Frankfurt School (Williams, 2016). The various sub-disciplines and intellectual movements mentioned here, as well as other more recent ones, have been collectively referred to as voice discourses (Moore and Muller, 1999). Voice discourses are characterised by ‘the claim that there can be no epistemology or theory of knowledge because fundamentally, it is only experience, not knowledge, science or expertise that we can ultimately rely on in judging whether something is true’ (Young, 2008: 4); and by their ‘attempts to displace a set of “dominant” knowledge claims by revealing those claims to be epistemologically spurious: the disguised interests and standpoint of the dominant group’ (Moore and Muller, 1999: 202). There are, then, at least these two components to voice discourses: sociological (a necessary category if we are jettisoning the idea of epistemology) and political.

Now, it does not take too much imagination to see academic literacies as an example of a voice discourse. The body of work known as the New Literacy Studies has already been referred to in passing as just that (Moore and Muller, 1999: 201, Luckett, 2012: 9). However, it is worth briefly comparing some of the features of work in academic literacies with features of voice discourses as outlined by social realist scholars such as Moore and Muller, both to ascertain how closely it fits this description, and to provide possible points of departure should literacies scholars feel the need to object to these (heavily) implied criticisms.

To start with, we can reiterate that the usage of the post-structuralist plural ‘literacies’ signals that there is more than a single, unitary literacy (Street, 1984), and that this move creates any number of potential literacies as objects for study: not just the literacies in themselves, but also the various interactions between them. To this we can add that, as suggested above, literacies are bound up with meaning making (and, we assume, sense-making), and that the negotiations of meaning making spoken of by social literacies scholars

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2 We assume that the links between the new literacy studies and academic literacies are well known and that what can be said of the former in this regard can also be said of the latter.
are carried out not least between extant ‘dominant’ literacies and those literacies that are attached to other, less privileged members. We can moreover point to the interrelation of literacies, knowledge, and meaning, noting that literacy practices and conventions are not reflective, but rather partly constitutive of, the ways in which knowledge is formed and regulated (Bazerman, 1981, 1988; Lillis, 1997).

Further to this plurality, voice discourses ‘identify a constituency or membership category and present themselves as the representation (representative) of that constituency, as its voice – the voice of “woman”, for example’ (Moore and Muller, 1999: 193). The result, according to Moore and Muller, is that the ‘realm of knowledge is re-presented as a cast of characters engaged in a drama of competing, antagonistic interests and struggles’ (Moore and Muller, 1999: 193). For this to work, it requires that the membership categories imply the predication of suitable behaviours, attributes, rights, obligations, knowledge, and similar (Hester, 1992; Baker, 2000) to the members. To take an example from recent campus polemics, a university might be considered to be ‘white’, and to teach and propound correspondingly white pedagogies and bodies (‘canons’) of knowledge. As soon as this move is made, there is the opportunity to create a set of oppositional, underprivileged social categories, as ‘where beliefs [or knowledge, etc.] can be assigned to an owner, then we are able to conceive of collectivities as standing in an asymmetrical relationship’ (Sharrock, 1970: 51). This then fulfils the requirements of the positioning strategy of voice discourses (Moore and Muller, 1999: 194): the positing of a subordinated standpoint; and a ‘critique of the dominant knowledge-form seen to be central to the construction of subordination’.

Reading empirical and programmatic work in academic literacies suggests that, while its practitioners are aware of the more egregious implications of voice discourses, and attempt to find nuanced ways of avoiding them, it is difficult to avoid trading in the categories that imply oppositional or asymmetrical power relations to start with. This is reflective of discourse norms which reflect those in power within the academy – traditionally white, middle-class, who have historically perpetuated the linguistic norms of academic writing to reflect their language use, referred to as ‘Standard’ English, in turn illustrative of cultural, and linguistic, capital (Bourdieu, 1991). Thus, Lillis (1999) and Paxton (2007) both point out that those students coming from white, middle-class backgrounds are more likely to have been exposed to literacies that are analogous to the ‘essayist literacies’ (Trimbur, 1990; Lillis, 1999; Schroeder, 2001) of the academy, and that this puts them in a privileged position. Essayist literacy is characterised not least by its removal of personal relationships, assumptions of ‘rational’ procedure, emphasis on ideas rather than identity and the need to avoid non-standard forms of English, thus potentially marginalising those that do.

Non-traditional learners, on the other hand, are either characterised as inapt to this form of literacy, perhaps due to prior non-exposure in their formal education, or as lacking academic support in coming to terms with it. At this point, it becomes tempting to use the membership categorisation devices pertaining to various kinds of ‘underprivileged’ learners for the political or transformative purposes of academic literacies (Williams, 2016: 163, 169). In particular, the various kinds of knowledge and practice deployed by students can end up being attributed either to predicates attached to an ‘underprivileged’ membership category (Williams, 2016), or to their efforts to avoid writing in ways associated with other groups. Hence, Paxton (2007: 47) shows that black students use ‘African secondary discourses’
drawn from local forms of poetry, while Lillis (in Rai, 2004: 157-8) provides an account of two students who both ‘point to the enforced need to imagine themselves and their words as white in order to disguise their selves, their Black, bilingual selves in their academic writing’.

Although these are clear enough examples of the ‘ownership’ of knowledge or forms of discourse, this recourse to what appear to be deterministic social or cultural predicates is in fact fairly uncommon in academic literacies scholarship, and its practitioners have used a number of methods that could be used to deflect unsophisticated attacks. To start with, an emphasis on student agency in writing (Scott, 1999) is used to neutralise the idea that student writers are ‘cultural dopes’ (Garfinkel, 1967); as Ivanič (1998: 184) puts it,

As people write, they have no alternative but to draw on the voices with which they are familiar: to write in ways that they have acquired through their life experience. Some writers have an immense repertoire of voices, of 'styles', from which to choose; some bring to the act of writing a set of contradictory voices: a repertoire shaped by a very varied life.

Although students are subject to influence, their writing is not determined by it; neither are all of these influences connected to student writers by dint of culture or common membership, but can be the result of individual biography. The work of Ivanič in particular shows how various influences can be chosen and deployed by student writers in highly personal and nuanced ways, depending on the setting and the writing task. We could reiterate this point in saying that another implication of the plural ‘literacies’ is a dynamic and contested understanding of writing rules and conventions.

A second technique is related to the understanding of the term ‘voice’ itself. Academic literacies does not proceed exactly as described by Moore and Muller, in the sense that its practitioners do not tend to take on the underprivileged identity for themselves. Academic literacies has been concerned to provide the opportunity for student writers’ voices to be heard, that is to present (rather than represent) these voices, and to demonstrate how they can be established dialogically in academic writing. In this sense, there is a Bakhtinian agenda at play (Ivanič, 1998; Lillis 2001, 2003) in which the presenting of student voice as an act with political content is inseparable from showing how this voice plays out within specific instances of writing. Inasmuch as academic literacies is a voice discourse, then, it does not have so narrow a concern with a single conception of ‘voice’ as Moore and Muller’s characterisation would make out.

A final point to make here is that a concern with issues of access and voice does not necessarily mean that the propositional or disciplinary knowledge defended by Moore, Muller, and Young (Moore and Muller, 2009; Muller and Young, 2014) is jettisoned. Haggis (2006: 522) has already attempted a compromise between what she calls ‘conventional’ and ‘radical’ approaches to higher education pedagogy, curriculum, and assessment; her argument

… accepts, for example, the privileging of abstract, propositional knowledge, rather than arguing, as would be possible, for the recognition of a wider range of types of knowledge in the academy. The intention here is to examine whether it might be possible to transform potentially alienating types of exposure to propositional
knowledge... into richer kinds of engagement, in order that a much wider range of students might gain access to conventional and established forms of knowledge and power.

In this way, knowledge, the idea of knowledge, and the role of disciplines, would be left intact. The difference would appear in adopting different ways of getting students to the same end of learning disciplinary content.

However, we are sceptical as to whether this approach could be accepted by either the social realist or academic literacies camp. The necessary pedagogical design principles here are liable to be those that, despite substituting dialogical for dialectical meaning making (cf. Lillis, 2003: 196 with Moore and Muller, 2009: 194), nonetheless imply the challenge of disciplinary boundaries, presume multiple accounts of truth, and facilitate the hybridity of text types (Lillis, 2003; Lea, 2004). It is easy to imagine that leaving propositional knowledge as is, but changing pedagogy, instruction, and curriculum to suit more inclusive ways of meaning making, would inevitably involve more slippage than would be countenanced by the social realists. So far, then, there would seem to be scope for narrowing the gap – or at least for opening discussions – between academic literacies and social realist critics. There are some remaining features of voice discourses, though, that are rather more problematic.

One of these relates to the characterisation of science and academia in general, as Moore and Muller put it, as ‘exclusively in positivist terms and [with] its massive social hegemony assumed but nowhere demonstrated’ (2009: 195). The result is a straw man that does not correspond to anything in reality, but which can be condemned *inter alia* for claiming the application of universal rules of procedure and for ‘views of language as transparent and representational’ (Usher and Edwards, in Moore and Muller, 2009.). The purported transparency of academic language usage has also been posited in academic literacies, notably by Lillis (1999), and Turner (1999). These examples have the same problems as other voice discourses, i.e. with ‘imputing ideological “beliefs” to actors in concrete situations when the actors do not explicitly express or acknowledge them’ (Lynch, 1995: 596).

A second problem relates to the very term ‘legitimate’ that we opened with. The idea of ‘legitimate’ tools for meaning making’ would represent, for Moore and Muller, the confusion of an empirical for a normative category: ‘it is in the slide from the social/moral to the epistemic that this perspective not only becomes questionable, but also fatally undermines the moral and political grounds that inspire it in the first place’ (2009: 194). Although we can partially deflect this accusation in the case of academic literacies as set out above, it is in this indiscriminate approach to ideologies, epistemologies, and semiotic resources that the social realist critique gains some of its purchase. The move that legitimises all symbolic forms as being ‘fundamentally the same, on the same epistemological footing, of the same type and structure’ (Moore and Muller, 2009: 201) results in ‘arguments that equate the legitimacy of knowledge solely with the social position of those who produce it’ (Young, 2008: 5) and works to de-legitimise hegemonic forms, including science. One of the decisions that critical disciplines need to make is whether hegemonic forms are adverse only by virtue of being hegemonic, and whether other symbolic forms need to be made more prominent, or whether more access to hegemonic forms would fulfil these critical aims just as well.
In short, there is more nuance available in this discussion than can be found in Moore and Muller’s near-caricature; nonetheless, there is certainly enough in the accounts of academic literacies for social realists to characterise it as a voice discourse. Another certainty is that it would be unwise to presume a uniform attitude on these issues on the part of academic literacies practitioners. Part of our concern here has been to discuss some of the matters that are revealed by this encounter of academic literacies and social realism, not least because the recent controversies around voice discourses and identity politics could lead to reductive perspectives on what is in fact a well-established field. What happens next is down to the scholars in the field.

However, we start from the assumption that what can count as legitimate meaning making resources in the academy can be examined empirically rather than decided by fiat. In the next section we introduce some examples of where and how this might be interrogated.

Religion and academic meaning making in the contemporary university

Religion provides us with an exemplar of a contested field in the academy inasmuch as it is subject to constant debate on its place in contemporary higher education. Despite its status as a protected characteristic (in the UK), despite the conflation of religion not least with race (Bauman and Saunders, 2009; Anthony, 2016; Stevenson, 2016), and despite general awareness of the implications of intersectionality, religion can be seen as the least of the protected characteristics on campus.3 For instance, Stevenson (2016) notes that data on the religious adherence of university students remains partial, raising questions about the ability of universities to effect anti-discrimination policies or practices.

Following Hopkins (2011: 158), we can assert that ‘university campuses are contested locations in terms of how they shape the production of knowledge, students’ lifecourse trajectories and politics and power relations’. With regard to religion, this contestation can call into question whether it ‘should be recognised as a ‘legitimate’ presence on the secular campus’ (Stevenson 2016) – let alone, we might say, as a legitimate way of coming to terms with the academy’s symbolic forms. Contestations around religion are often played out around practical matters: prayer spaces, examination timetables, and the suitability of religious guest speakers, and this is to be expected in contexts where religious diversity and the increasing confidence of non-Christian, traditionally minority faiths has led to the need for more nuanced understandings of secularisation (Gilliat-Ray, 2000). Yet it remains broadly accurate to say that ‘British universities are proudly secular’ in intention (Stevenson 2016), even if the secularising tendencies within universities arise from other means than overt policy making or alignment of identity (Guest, 2012; Guest et al., 2013: 107ff.).

Our interest, though, is in the scope for faith-based meaning making in instructional contexts. The extent of the contested nature of religion in the academy with regard to teaching, assessment, and syllabi is highlighted by a report from the Equality Challenge Unit,

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3 Our experience of conducting empirical studies suggests that slights to religious belief and practice might be tolerated where inequalities of race, gender, or disability would not be. However, these examples are taken from instructional settings in a university, and despite some initial warm reception to this idea of religion being the ‘least among equals’ of protected characteristics at least in the academy, we suspect that much depends on the setting (see also Vander Lei & Fitzgerald 2007: 186). An interesting agenda for future research would be to ascertain where and how certain protected characteristics become more or less protected.
which showed that ‘For 48.1% and 46.9% of respondents [both staff and students], religion or belief is not considered relevant to course content and teaching, respectively’ (Weller et al., 2011: 35). Some initial examples of how this contention works in practice come from a small qualitative study of the university experience of self-selecting students of faith, funded by the Society for Research into Higher Education (SRHE), and conducted by the authors in 2015 at their home university, a red-brick institution in the UK.

We provide here two instances of Catholic students who had cause to be concerned with ethical matters within their studies: one through political philosophy; and two students who were taking the same bioethics course in a neuroscience programme. A recurring theme in what students told us was that their faith provided them with a ready-made ethical framework that they could use to inform not only their personal actions, but also to apply to their academic work, not least in critique of other, often theoretical viewpoints. The use of these faith-based ethics in the context of university instructional settings was seen by the students as defensible, and a use of their faith that should be untrammelled even when confronted by the secular ethical orthodoxies prevailing on campus.

The first of these, Student R, described a class that was discussing cultural relativism. What Student R characterises as one of the implications of a generally liberalised society (and for the most part, student body) is a political correctness that removes the right to criticise others.

*I feel that there is a lot of push to just say that you can’t judge anyone else – regardless of what they are doing. That just, not only with my personal philosophy, but with my religious philosophy, just doesn’t seem logical to me. That is a kind of anarchism in my opinion. There have to be rules that people have to abide by and so that presents a challenge. Just because to me, reasoning my argument from religion makes perfect sense, but it’s just not accepted. And so I have to think of arguments that I wouldn’t usually think of. They still make sense to me, but it just makes it like doing something twice. Like, I already have the argument from religion, that makes sense. Now I have to find the exact same argument from the secular rules.*

This signals an important set of insights into contemporary campus life: not least that there are certain domains of knowledge that struggle to be heard, and that they can be deafened with equal facility by fellow students as by the teaching staff who are generally held to be the arbiters of what counts as disciplinary knowledge. Student R had a strong background in Western philosophy, from the ecclesiasts of the Middle Ages, through theist philosophers and thence to the professionalization and secularisation of the discipline. It is not clear if Student R’s arguments were faith-inspired or whether they had their origin in philosophies that happen to be Christian; but it is evident from this account that when seeking acceptance from peers in a classroom context, the path through which conclusions are reached is just as important as the terminus. It is also not determined whether it is the problem of the religious origin or the fact that the end point is contra the relativist consensus that generates the most dissent. Student R implies that it is more the former, given that his classmates are described as generally ‘atheist or agnostic’.
This example also begs the question of how the relevance of the kinds of points that Student R was making is decided in classroom settings. It is tempting to imagine that this must involve the purposive deployment of a coherent battery of ideas antagonistic to another – a ‘hegemonic’ set, perhaps. This is more likely to be the case in written assessment, perhaps (see next section), but it is entirely possible in classroom settings for topics and lines of discussion to be put aside or taken up in a moment. This instance therefore points to the need for close empirical work, with an eye on what the logical and strategic possibilities are within disciplinary discourses, to allow stakeholders to ascertain what count as legitimate resources in a given time and space.

The second example was jointly described by Student O and Student W. The former gave this account of a lecture in Bioethics:

So you have a list of options, and there will be a dilemma. The one that struck me was: “who should have the rights to IVF?” and there were four options A, B, C, D. All four options presupposed that someone should have the right to IVF. There was not an option that said “no one should have the right to IVF”. I suppose that if there was that option then it may well have been only one percent of people. But I think that you need the options, so I emailed the professor and I said I think the option should have been there. And I got the email back “that’s a very good point, you raise an excellent point and I’ll note it down for next year”. It wasn’t a, it was just a lack of awareness, but it’s not a kind of, she was very receptive and I actually thought, surprising that a professor of Ethics shouldn’t [have thought of this].

Here, it was not necessary to have a religious faith to suggest a point that is both a clear logical possibility and a practical issue. This was, though, the inspiration behind Student O’s dismay and subsequent contact with the lecturer. The value of Student O bringing up this issue is not so that we would be led to talk about religious faith in itself, but that this intercession gets to a place that is self-evidently productive for further discussion. As with the example of Student R, what has potential to fit within the disciplinary discourse is the additional ethico-logical possibility afforded by religious thought, rather than the symbolic content of the faith itself. To this extent, we can say that these were valuable contributions to the respective classrooms; whether this would be seen as an acceptable alternative to wholesale recognition of the students’ religious identity would have to be commented on by academic literacies practitioners and the students themselves. However, this example does offer a clue as to the legitimacy of faith within academia: if beliefs are faith-inspired, as with Student O, this need not lead to a declaration of faith per se. Instead, when faith and reason coincide, then this offers the possibility to use one’s faith, not necessarily declare it.

Religion and academic literacy practices
As we have mentioned above, there are few examples of religious belief as an aspect of identity highlighted for investigation in academic literacies work. Two examples where it is briefly touched upon are Thesen (1997) and Lillis (2003), the latter providing a useful point of departure. Lillis (2003: 203) presents the thoughts of a student, Sara, a Muslim and a student in Psychology who ‘continued to struggle to balance her spiritual and academic
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interests’. Sara saw potential, at least in this example, for her ‘theoretical side’ and ‘spiritual side’ to work together:

[referring to a book on spirituality] I was thinking, my God, I could link this into psychology, cause it’s talking about the self, the true you in other words. And I thought, my God, I’m studying the self at the moment, you know, from childhood and there’s so many things. And I thought, I could bring them together, you know, they sort of intertwine and I thought, it’s so interesting. And I thought, if I put that in my assignment, they’ll think [laughs] what’s she talking about, this woman? … They’ll think I’m crackers. They’ll think [pause, lowers tone of voice] ‘fail’. So I think I can’t put that in then (Lillis, 2003: 203-4).

Both Sara and Student R see the potential personal benefit in bringing together aspects of their faith and academic studies. Whereas Student R is prepared to explore and challenge the extent of acceptable discourse in his class discussions, bolstered by his desire to challenge a relativist ethics in whatever way he can and by his knowledge of both theist and non-theist philosophy, Sara appears to operate with a highly pragmatic idea of where the boundaries are and what it would take to transgress them. Lillis’s conclusion is that Sara ‘doesn’t risk bringing together two discourses which the academy considers as incompatible. She doesn’t risk the possibility of dialogic encounter’ (2003: 204). What Sara presents, then, is a discoursal self free, or freed, from the influence of her autobiographical self (Ivanič, 1998).

What we lack in prior academic literacies studies, then, are examples of the autobiographical self as expressed through religious identity being actively used in student assessment. We present two such examples here. The first is described in Smith (2016), and is the instance that inspired our SRHE study. The second comes from the SRHE study itself.

Smith (2016) outlines the case of a mature student, ‘Cathy’, a born-again Christian, writing an essay for a second year Sociology course in gender and sexuality. At one point during an interview Cathy is asked whether she feels she has the opportunity to put her own views and opinions into her work. This occasioned the following stretch of conversation (S = student, I = investigator):

S: Yeah, I just don’t know how! I don’t know how you’re supposed to do it, so I just – especially in my Gender essay, because I really struggled with that course anyway because of my faith and some of the issues that were coming up. And I didn’t feel like I could put my opinion in, because I didn’t – obviously I had the Bible to back it up, but I didn’t know how, or – basically I went to see someone at the church who is the head teacher and he said, just leave it out, because that’s not what they’re expecting to see anyway, so I just left it out. But I did feel that I wanted my opinion to be in but I wasn’t sure of how to go about that. So I kind of went around it, and did a quite broad context really.

I: So what you ended up with was a broad discussion...
S: Yeah, I kind of mentioned the Bible and stuff like that, but I didn’t really put my opinion in, because I didn’t know how to back it up really.

A little later in the same interview the same issue briefly surfaced again:

I: Did you come down in favour of this – because it’s quite a flat statement, isn’t it – did you come down in favour of that or against it, or neither?

S: Against what it’s saying. I don’t believe nature has nothing to do with our sexuality.

I: And did you manage to find any kind of authors or, you know, ammunition that backed you up in that [view]?

S: In terms of my faith, I believe that nature… I mean I believe that God created us, so...I really can’t remember in depth. I’ve done five more [essays] since then.

Analysis of the interview, in conjunction with the student’s essay and feedback, reveals a similar concern with what can be included as personal views when they are so intimately connected with discourses that are dispreferred by the academy. In this case, Cathy saw the constructivist social science orthodoxy as, if not inimical to, then at least in direct contradiction of her beliefs. In effect, writing within Bakhtin’s ‘authoritative discourse’ (Lillis, 2003) could be equated with propounding the messages of this orthodoxy. As a result, Cathy’s essay occupied a ‘third space’ (Wilson, 2000) whereby minimum standards had to be observed to adhere to the requirements of two discourses seen by Cathy as incommensurable. The essay did not receive a high mark, but inasmuch as it was recognisable as academic discourse while propounding a creationist rather than constructivist line, it could be seen as admirably ‘recipient designed’ for its purpose (Sacks et al., 1974). Cathy successfully deployed those technologies of the self (Foucault, 1988) that allowed her to find a workable compromise between different aspects of writer identity.

Another feature of this case study worth noting was the description of the course itself as provided by two lecturers. Read for the purposes of this paper, they provide both a defence of the need for disciplinary knowledge, and presage some of the concerns with identity politics that have intensified over the last few years. One of the lecturers, SP, provided a clear understanding of what the course aimed to achieve:

SP: Its aim is to change people’s thinking. A lot of students arrive with the attitude that there’s something natural to gender and that ultimately they are natural qualities, something inherent. It’s a very sociological or cultural studies project in that it seeks to encourage students to investigate the idea that these things we take as natural are in fact constructed, the results of human interaction.

An immediate reaction to this standard social science inversion (‘the world is not as you think’) is that it would no doubt be a worthwhile pedagogical approach for the majority
of students, but perhaps not for those who come determined not to have their minds changed.\(^4\) The implication of SP’s approach to delivering the course was that academic independence and autonomous thinking would only come about through an initially disciplined – in both senses (Foucault, 1975; Turner, 2003) – focus on sociological knowledge. The deployment of personal experience in written assessment at this stage of academic development was something that was seen to carry risks; as SP memorably said, ‘they need to get to know what the debates are, what the issues and what the paradigms are before they start doing anything as sophisticated as using their own experience’.

The delivery of the gender and sexuality course, then, had clear aims and a defined pedagogical approach, with lecturers familiar with the manifold challenges that their course posed to students. Faced with this example, it is difficult to conclude that simply because students are bringing personal interests and symbolic influences into the academy with them, that ‘there is a need to re-examine what counts as relevant knowledge within and across academic disciplines’ (Lillis, 2003: 205). To balance this, though, there are some other pedagogical possibilities that can be drawn out. To quote again from the lecturers:

\[
SP: \text{It may just be that the kind of people who sign up for that particular course either observe the kind of power dynamic and are maybe reluctant to speak out. Also it’s not just the power dynamic between student and teacher. I guess anybody who might express that particular view, whether it’s religious or secular, they might be just as afraid of vocalising that because of peer pressure. They might calculate that people who elect to do this course might be more likely to have more liberal views about sexuality ... it’s part of the academic doxa that this course really is attuned to people with liberal beliefs and attitudes, isn’t it, and invites that way of thinking.}
\]

Although what happens beyond the sight or purview of university teaching staff might be hard to influence, an awareness of these trends in student behaviour could feed into pedagogical decisions in productive ways. In this example there is an assumption on the part of the lecturers that students will experience academic development such that there will be a point, after proper inculcation into a disciplinary heritage, at which they will possess the tools to ask their own questions, possibly questions about themselves. Although it is notoriously difficult to explain the principles of course design or marking criteria (Lea and Street, 1998), finding structured ways to encourage student development is imperative. This would include encouraging students to find suitable ways of and occasions for confronting their personal experience with the prevailing concerns of their discipline. This may well in due course lead to the discipline developing, but this would not be through an uncritical acceptance of all symbolic forms.

The second example presents a more positive outcome. A student in our SRHE study, Student H, wrote an essay on the films of Frank Capra (specifically, his ‘political trilogy’) that overtly drew on her Catholic faith for its controlling argument. Given Capra’s own Catholic background and various religious interpretations of his work among film critics, the

\(^4\)Although the secularising effect of universities can work in a variety of ways, and even on those who commence their studies with strongly-held faiths.
marker was willing to accept the essay on its own terms and, although he was critical of some aspects, was positive overall:

S: It’s a very Catholic spirituality, and for me the plot and the ending in particular has always seemed unfinished. Actually they were unfinished when you compare it to Catholic theology so I sort of looked at that and looked at Christian iconography which is used as well for the ‘Passion of Christ’ and the ‘Passion of Modern History’, and brought that in and I actually received a very decent mark for [it] because, it was even though my tutor didn’t agree with every point, and I could see where I had maybe fallen down in certain things. He appreciated that new perspective that I don’t necessarily [see] was there in the scholarship.

Student H received extensive feedback on the essay, with the marker suggesting that it could have been more sharply written, but concluding that:

I think the religious dimensions you’re interested in are nevertheless very thoughtful and inventive even, and I don’t doubt your abilities in matching up Catholic preaching and practice with some of the themes Capra evoked all those years before.

The student appears to have reaped the benefits of an approach that precisely weighed the role of a Catholic analytical framework in the context of a disciplinary discourse. Existing work that invokes Capra’s Catholic iconography provides contiguity and a precedent. Specifying a Catholic, rather than a generically ‘Christian’ spirituality allowed a mode of analysis and conclusions that could be stated in filmic terms. Student R refrained from judging Capra on the ‘quality’ of his Catholicism, and demonstrated that the Catholic ideas that would have been formative in Capra’s youth are ‘readable’ in his films. The marker, despite signs that he knew why Student R approached this essay in the way she did, was given no cause to question the relevance of how these influences were adduced.

Implications for egalitarian practice
Ultimately, we have started to discuss the ways and extent to which students can use their faith as a legitimate academic resource. Our examples show, tentatively speaking, that there is room for one’s faith to be a part of a discussion, but that students do not generally see that the path from their beliefs to their conclusions is most efficacious when it is explicitly revealed. Further, while there will clearly be different boundaries according to the discipline, genre, and instructional setting, the scope for faith-based academic meaning making is occasioned by the specific context, with no clear, prior, overarching rules.

The results gained from our SRHE study support the assertion of many commentators on higher education that there are prevailing orthodoxies – relativist, pro-choice, secular, atheist, neo-liberal – on university campuses that influence what can and can’t be said. This has occasioned the purported ‘crisis of free speech’ in universities (Anthony, 2016; Williams, 2016). The student accounts provided to us would suggest that rather than being the domain of a ‘vocal minority’ of student union officials or similar, these orthodoxies are widely shared by students when it comes to instructional settings. Something that needs to be borne in mind
by future research, then, is that disciplinary knowledge and boundaries are not defended by professional disciplinary gatekeepers alone.

Many universities are diverse and international places. However, as pointed out by Stevenson (2016), in the UK, this diversity is currently tolerated rather than celebrated. The opportunities for falling foul of campus orthodoxies are legion, and both the ‘liberal left’ and the ostensibly conservative disciplines can fall into these traps (Blair, 2016). Finding ways in which ‘socially just’ teaching practices can intersect with disciplinary rigour would be productive in a number of ways: by promoting freedom of speech; by developing student selfhood; and by delineating the boundaries of academic disciplines. This is nowhere more important than in a post-colonial context, whether this concerns former colonies where religion has been the site of rapprochement (e.g. South Africa), or former colonisers that are starting to realise that they act as hosts for all manner of cultures and faiths (e.g. the UK).

Conclusions
We started this paper by asking how we could decide what ‘legitimate tools for meaning making’ in university writing would be. We have used religious faith as our testing ground for this investigation. Given, then, that we are saying that it is not a given for all symbolic forms to be considered ‘suitable for academic consumption’, it is necessary to establish methods for coming to these decisions. So far, we have proceeded empirically.

With this in mind, some of the examples outlined above demonstrate that the influence of faith can be productive and provide legitimate resources for academic work. The two examples involving student writing show, respectively, unsuccessful and successful cases of students exploring the boundaries of academic discourses for potential involvement of faith. It is evident that this ‘boundary work’ as carried out by both staff and students is extremely important in delineating the form and content of disciplines.

The following questions incorporate what we have taken from this investigation, and could be used to inform both further research and teaching. They constitute a set of topics for investigating ‘legitimate’ resources for academic meaning making with reference to religion.

- How is the boundary work managed? What are the practical methods used to establish what counts as disciplinary knowledge, or writing? What reasons are given?
- Who is doing this? What are the identities of those who are carrying out the boundary work?
- Are the resources in question expressive of faith in themselves, or are they faith-inspired and designed with a view to fitting into a disciplinary discourse?
- Under what auspices are the resources being characterised as ‘faith’ resources? Is it possible to understand them in other ways?
- Is the student deploying faith resources concertedly (as perhaps in writing), or more provisionally / occasionally (as in class discussion)? Are there modal differences?
- What are the pedagogical aims and approaches within the setting, and how do they occasion boundary work?
- What are the implications of faith for this discipline, in this setting?
- How is the separation of (disciplinary) knowledge and personal identity manifested?
These questions go to show that there is a great deal more qualitative work that can be done. At any point, though, a critical space remains in which the instructor can consider what happens as a matter of course, and what might happen differently. This is the point at which the instructor can say (following Street et al., 2015: 386), ‘let’s negotiate that difference … let’s look more closely at what the students are bringing and look more closely at what the tutors are expecting, then let’s talk about how the two can mesh together’ (also Vander Lei and Fitzgerald, 2007).

In our view, then, the time is right for the field of academic literacies to reconsider some of the matters that perhaps it thought it had concluded. The field has come too far for it to be tarred with the ‘voice discourse’ brush when it has the research and pedagogical agenda to provide genuine nuance in these debates.

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